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I. INTRODUCTION
Museums in the United States and around the world are
coming under attack from various groups because many hold what is
believed to be Nazi-looted art from the Holocaust.1 While numerous
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1 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (W.D.
Wash. 2000); Her Majesty's Attorney-General v. The Trustees of the British
Museum, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1089, [1]-[8] (Eng.); Press Release, Worcester Art
Museum, Case of Nazi-Looted Art Solved at Worcester Art Museum (Apr. 30,
2004), available at http://www.worcesterart.org/Information/PR/Past/4-30-04.html;
Michael J. Reppas II, Empty "International" Museums' Trophy Cases of Their
Looted Treasures and Return Stolen Property to the Countries of Origin and the
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scholars and researchers have taken it upon themselves to address
potential ways to resolve the disputes by means other than litigation,
only a handful of publications address the solutions are available for
individual current possessors of Nazi-looted art. This article proposes
a new look at the Internal Revenue Code as a viable option for
current possessors and claimants to effectively and equitably resolve
the disputes.
2
Although there is growing concern about the use of art
investments as a tax shelter, which may serve to encourage illicit
trade in stolen artwork, 3 there is a more subtle, and arguably, more
sympathetic view for the favorable use of the Internal Revenue Code
("the tax Code") in the art and cultural property trade world. Intrin-
sically linked to the illicit trade in antiquities is the devastation that
occurred at the hands of the Nazi regime during World War II. When
the Allied troops liberated Paris in 1944, the Nazi regime had pillag-
ed approximately one-fifth to one-third of all the art in Europe.
4
Rightful Heirs of Those Wrongfilly Dispossessed, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93,
93 (2007).
2 See Kiesha Minyard, Adding Tools to the Arsenal: Options for Restitution from the
Intermediary Seller and Recovery for Good-Faith Possessors of Nazi-Looted Art, 43
TEX. INT'L L.J. 115 (2007) (discussing the resolution options offered by the U.S.
court system through litigation).
3 In 2008, federal agents searched the art museums, private homes, and storage sites
in the Los Angeles area, where they discovered numerous rare artifacts that were
illegally imported into the United States. Applications for the warrants said that
smugglers and art dealers were selling prehistoric artifacts to Americans, who were
provided with inflated appraisals used for tax deductions when the items were
donated to the museums. See Matthew L. Wald, Tax Scheme Is Blamed for Damage
to Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at El; see also Leah K. Antonio. The Current
Status of the International Art Trade, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 51, 58
(1986) ("Many commentators agree that the use of art investments as tax shelters is a
prime factor for the flourishing illicit trade in stolen or counterfeit art."); L. DEBOFF,
THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 1984 SUPPLEMENT XIV 20-29 (1984) (discussing fine
art investments as tax shelters); Joseph H. Marxer, Note. Section 183 of the Internal
Revenue Code: The Need for Statutory Reform. 62 IND. L.J. 425, 426 n.10 (1987)
("Tax shelters involving fine art have become quite commonplace."); Susan E.
Wagner, Note. The Implications of Changing the Current Law on Charitable
Deductions Maintaining Incentives for Donating Art to Museums, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
773, 776-77 (1986) (discussing the potential use of artwork as a tax shelter).
4 Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering Nazi-LootedArt: Report From the Front Lines, 16
CONN. J. INT'L L. 297, 298 (2001); Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned.
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Today, tens of thousands of works of art are still missing, but many
items have made their way into museums, private collections, and
auction houses in the United States. 5 Thus, individuals or entities in
the United States may be unaware - or aware - that a piece of art-
work they own has Nazi taint. As the original owners' and their
heirs' claims for restitution and other legal claims become more
prevalent, individuals and entities are unwilling to hand over the
artwork because of their monetary investment in the item.
This article focuses on the need for an alternative solution to
litigating Nazi-looted art claims. It proposes the use of section
501(c)(3) governmental organizations as mediums to achieve the
public policy goals that courts and lawmakers have struggled with
over the last few years. In particular, this article argues that the tax
Code achieves the most equitable outcome for parties involved in
disputes involving Nazi-looted art. Part II provides historical back-
ground to the current situation involving Nazi-looted art, emphasiz-
ing the deep emotional and psychological underpinnings. Part III
introduces the complexity of litigating and resolving Nazi-looted art
cases. Part IV examines a variety of past and contemporary proposals
and guidelines by lawmakers and organizations that have addressed
the current situation involving Nazi-looted art. It advances the
proposition that the tax Code can be used as a practical device to
accomplish the overarching policy goals that the proposals and
guidelines have failed to meet. Part V introduces and analyzes the
possible tax solutions offered by section 170 and section 501(c)(3) of
the tax Code. It proposes the creation of a federal entity organized
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to relieve the
burden placed upon museums and similar institutions in the trans-
actions. The article concludes in Part VI with a discussion of the need
for government intervention in the area of Nazi-looted art and the
need for a more cohesive body of law, which the tax code can
provide. The goal of this article is to persuade the reader that the
Internal Revenue Code is a viable - and neutral - tool to resolve
Nazi-looted artwork disputes, instead of relying on courts, which are
The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of
Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 549, 558 (1999).
5 HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 4 (Basic Books 1998) (1997).
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inadequately equipped to deal with the political, emotional, and
psychological connections that may come into play in these contexts.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Nazi policies of discrimination, persecution, and
extermination took on an economic dimension. 6 Even before the
victory of the Allied powers during World War II, it was clear that
the economic and political landscape of Europe had changed forever.
The destruction of cities, the devastation of economies, and the
displacement of people contributed to the future events of what
would eventually become known as the Cold War. 7 However, in the
months following the aftermath of World War II, the world would
come to know not only of the gross human violations suffered at the
hands of the Nazi regime, but also of the cultural devastation that the
Nazi regime had accomplished. During this period, the Allied forces
discovered that the Nazis had looted their victims' assets, which
ranged from precious metals to antique artwork. 8 In effect, the Nazi
regime had carried out the greatest art theft in human history. 9
6 PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE U.S., PLUNDER
AND RESTITUTION: THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST
ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES AND STAFF REPORT. S. REP. No. 1. at Ch. 2 (2000)
[hereinafter PACHA], available at http://www.pcha.gov/PlunderRestitution.html/
html/StaffChapter2.html; see also LYNN H. NICHOLS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE
FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(1994).
7 See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 1139-40 (Simon
& Schuster 1960) (1959) (describing the aftermath of World War II); 3 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA BRITANNICA 444 (15th ed. 2007) ("[N]ear the close of World War II, the
uneasy wartime alliance between the United States and Great Britain on the one
hand and the Soviet Union on the other began to unravel .... The Cold War had
solidified by 1947 .... ").
8 PACHA, supra note 6.
9 See Spiegler. supra note 4, at 298; see also Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling
Individual and Group Justice with the Needfor Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 155, 178-79 (2007). In 1948, the U.S. office of Military Govern-
ment announced that U.S. troops discovered nearly 10.7 million cultural objects in
Nazi storage areas. Paulina McCarter Collins, Has "The Lost Museum" Been
Found? Declassification of Government Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets
Offer Real Opportunity to "Do Justice"for Holocaust Victims on the Issue of Nazi-
LootedArt, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 125 (2002).
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During the reign of Hitler and the Third Reich, "as many
works of art were displaced, transported and stolen as during the
entire Thirty Years War or all the Napoleonic Wars." 10 Although the
capture of art and cultural property during war is an ancient
practice,1 1 the Nazis went beyond the bounds of decency and
decimated European cultures. The Nazi regime made it a policy to
wipe out entire cultures by destroying cultural property or assimilat-
ing it into what Hitler saw as the ideal culture. 12 "Inherent in Hitler's
dreams of a pure Germanic race was a vision of pure Germanic art.
His two-fold plan involved ridding his empire of 'degenerate art' and
amassing a vast collection of pure Germanic art .. "13 Believing that
the modern artistic sensibility led to a decline in morals, Hitler saw a
direct correlation between the rise in artistic expression and the rise
in political progressiveness.
14
The Nazi regime carried out these acts with precision and
efficiency. 15 A specialized unit, named the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter
Rosenberg (hereinafter "ERR"), performed a substantial amount of
the looting.16 The ERR served a dual purpose. First, it found and took
10 FELICIANO, supra note 5. at 23.
11 See Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim
Fine Arts Litigation and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule. 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 87, 92 (1999) (providing examples of art pillaging across time).
12 Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to Resolve
Disputes Relating to Artwvorks Stolen or Looted During World War IL 10 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 27, 30 (1999); see also Spiegler. supra note 4, at
298.
13 Kelly Ann Falconer, Comment, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a
Legally Binding International Agreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art,
21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 383, 394 (2000).
14 See id
15 See generally Raymond J. Dowd, Federal Courts and Stolen Art: Our Duty to
History, 55 FED. LAW 4, 4 (2008) (describing the "legal structure" the Nazis put in
place to systematically dispossess Jews of their property). Nearly ten percent of
Germany's budget came from property stolen from Jews. Id.
16 FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 35. Initially. Hitler divided this task between three
competing groups: the Wehrmacht. the German diplomatic corps. and the ERR,
which took orders directly from Nazi Party leader Alfred Rosenberg. Id. at 35-36.
But eventually, with convincing by Reichmarschall Hermann Goering, the ERR
became the Third Reich's primary vehicle for seizing and confiscating art in Europe.
Id. at 35; see also JOHN E. CONKLIN, ART CRIME 218-19 (Praeger Publishers 1994)
(1994) (explaining Goering's control over the ERR).
2009
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
artworks the Nazis valued.17 Second, it aimed to rid the German
empire of so-called "degenerate art."1 8 Estimates place the value of
the items looted by Nazis to be equal to the current fair market value
of approximately 20.5 billion dollars. 19 The Third Reich's ravages
were not "a mere incident of war, but an official Nazi policy" - an
imperative of the regime directed by Hitler himself.
20
After the War, Allied troops attempted to return the looted
items to their original owners, but many remained ownerless.
21
Nevertheless, many of these items found their way into the stream of
commerce in the United States and around the world. Items began
resurfacing in various art galleries, auction houses, private collect-
ions, and museums. Unfortunately, the Nazi regime's displace-ment
of numerous European cultural items resonates today, more than six
decades later. Many Nazi victims and their descendants are still in
the process of locating and reclaiming their family's stolen cultural
property, each with varying degrees of success.
With the declassification of government documents, globaliz-
ation, advances in telecommunications, and increased interests in the
subject matter by scholars, there has been an increase in legal
17 See Falconer, supra note 13, at 394.
18 Id. "Degenerate" art encompassed several types of art Hitler despised, including
modern art, FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 20-2 1. and art by Jewish artists or depicting
Jewish subjects, Emily J. Henson. Comment, The Last Prisoners of War: Returning
World War II Art to Its Rightful Owners Can Moral Obligations Be Translated
into Legal Duties?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2002). Though the initial
purpose in seizing "degenerate" art was to destroy it, id at 1106, Nazi authorities
soon realized its value in the marketplace, see Schlegelmilch, supra note 11. at 88.
19 Spiegler. supra note 4, at 299 (citing Michael J. Bazyler. Nuremberg in America:
Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1. 161
(2000)).
20 Id at 298; see also FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 4 ("If Hitler ... had not been
interested in the arts, Nazi art looting would certainly not have been a war priority..
. ."); Barbara J. Tyler. The Stolen Museum: Have United States Art Museums
Become Inadvertent Fences for Stolen Art Works Looted by the Nazis in World War
II?, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 441, 447 (1999) ("At Hitler's direction, the Third Reich looted
and hoarded family collections and museums alike in fulfilling Hitler's covetousness
for fine art.").
21 Greg Bradsher, Documenting Nazi Plunder of European Art, THE RECORD, Nov.
1997, available at, http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/records-and-
research/documenting-nazi-plunder-of-european-art.html.
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disputes to settle the ownership of Nazi-looted art.22 Normally, these
lawsuits consist of original victims, their heirs, or descendants charg-
ing museums, private owners, galleries, and others with possession
of stolen goods because the cultural property was never returned to
them in the aftermath of World War II. However, many of the Nazi-
looted items were "acquired by good-faith purchasers who paid fair
value for the artwork or received the artwork as a donation, as is
often the case for a museum."23 Thus, the complexities of litigation
primarily involve claims of good title. Also intertwined with these
claims are the passionate feelings aroused by attachment to a work of
art, as well as the overwhelming psychological implications of the
atrocities of the Holocaust. These factors do not make litigation
simple or short, and it is these considerations this article now
addresses.
III. COMPLEXITIES OF LITIGATING NAZI-
LOOTED ART CASES
World War II invokes deep emotions for many people. As
such, bringing claims for Nazi-looted art before a court necessarily
implicates these emotions. Even though judges and juries try to be
impartial, it is difficult not to feel some sort of emotional or psycho-
logical inclinations. 24 Due to these unique and complex circum-
22 See generally Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Callfor a New Attitude
Toward Artwork Stolen During World War IL 32 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 1
(1998).
23 Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problems and the Role of the Museum: A
Proposed Solution To Disputes Over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 15, 15
(1998).
24 Emotional feelings are often illustrated in court opinions through the choice of
language. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 820 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1966) ("In the
case at bar, the underlying transaction was the looting, plunder and pillage by the
Nazis, which was of the very essence of evil.... The law stands as a bulwark
against the handiwork of evil. to guard to rightful owners the fruits of their labors.");
see also Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG. 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 285 (D.N.J. 1999)
("Every human instinct yearns to remediate in some way the immeasurable wrongs
inflicted upon so many millions of people by Nazi Germany so many years ago,
wrongs in which corporate Germany unquestionably participated."); In re Nazi Era
Cases Against German Defendants Litig.. 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 389 (D.N.J. 2001)
("[I]f pure evil has ever existed, it was undeniably manifest in the conduct of the
Nazi government and its corporate henchmen during the 1930s and 1940s.... No
2009
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stances, many commentators recommend resolution outside of the
courtroom.25
In addition to the emotional ramifications of litigating Nazi-
looted art cases, other significant factors make the resolution of these
claims especially complex. One of the most influential reasons why
commentators suggest parties settle is because of time. While typical
disputes regarding title do not involve prolonged periods of time,
thefts of Nazi-looted art occurred more than sixty years ago, and so
locating the artwork can be extremely difficult.26 Considering that the
thefts occurred in a time of war, much of the artwork has since
crossed many borders and has vanished without leaving any traces.
The global transport of artwork, along with the lapse in time, has
made efforts to find Nazi-looted artwork almost futile - that is, until
the last decade.
From 1945 through 1995, only ten Holocaust-related suits
were filed in American courts.27 However, since 1995, with the
growth of technology and global communication, 28 Nazi-looted art
amount of money could ever restore life to the tens-of-millions whose lives were
taken, or compensate the millions of survivors whose lives were destroyed.").
25 See Distribution of Unclaimed or Heirless Property Left Over After the Holocaust,
House Comm. on Int. Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Stuart Eizenstat,
Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agriculture).
26 Thomas Kline, Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust, Recovery of Stolen Art
Sold in the United States from a "Neutral" Country, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 243,
245 (1998). This has become somewhat easier to do than in the past. See Spiegler,
supra note 4, at 300. But see Benjamin E. Pollock. Comment, Out of the Night and
Fog: Permitting Litigation To Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted
Art Claims, 43 Hous. L. REv. 193, 206 (2006) ("The art trade faces an uphill battle
in any attempt at regulation, as art is highly mobile, easy to conceal, and difficult to
trace."); Spiegler. supra note 4, at 301 (arguing that building a successful claim still
requires searching through a multitude of records); Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance
and Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes: Recovery of Art Looted During the
Holocaust, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 243, 256 (2006) (commenting
on the high non-participation rate in a recent survey investigating museums'
potentially stolen holdings).
27 Bazyler. supra note 19, at 7.
28 Major museums are beginning to disseminate the inventory that they have to the
public via internet postings. which specifically "identify artworks in their collections
with gaps in provenance between 1933 and 1945." Spiegler, supra note 4, at 301-02
(citing Celestine Bohlen. Museums Accept Stronger Role in Search for Looted Art,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com (search "Museums
accept stronger role" and select the "All Results Since 1851 tab)).
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claims have increased dramatically. Primarily, the surge in claims is
due to the new availability of documents worldwide. Prior to the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War prevented access to
basically all of the key records and documents concerning Nazi-
looted art located within the Soviet Union.29 Thus, hopes of finding
stolen pieces of art were very low. However, the fall of communism
in Eastern Europe shed new light on the whereabouts of many stolen
pieces. 30 The previously concealed documents and records were
exposed to the world. Similarly, many records kept by Allied forces
from World War II were classified for many years. As one United
States Congresswoman stated, "[f]ederal agencies have been permit-
ed to keep certain information secret at the expense of families and
researchers who are simply looking for closure and answers to
questions that have plagued them for decades." 31 As these records
have started to become available to the world, some individuals and
organizations have been able to begin tracking down their stolen
items. 32 However, searching through the multitude of documents is
difficult, even for the most efficient and skilled attorney.33
After locating a piece of artwork, claimants must establish the
right to make a claim, which is often a difficult and complicated
29 Leah J. Weiss, Note, The Role of Museums in Sustaining the Illicit Trade in
Cultural Property, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 837, 866-67 (2007).
30 Schlegelmilch, supra note 11. at 97 n.60 (citing Lynn H. Nichols, Introduction to
THE SPOILS OF WAR: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH 47, 47 (Elisabeth Simpson
ed. 1997) (1997) ("With the end of the Cold War and the opening up of Eastern
Europe. it has become apparent that large numbers of works of art previously
thought to be lost are, in fact, stored in repositories in countries of the former Soviet
Union.")).
31 Rep. Carolyn Maloney, quoted in Joseph Altman. Jr.. Washington Briefing/A
Weekly Report on People and Issues in the Nation's Capital/Unraveling Nazi War
Crimes/President Set to Sign Bill Declassifying Documents. NEWSDAY, Aug. 16,
1998, at A22.
32 See Spiegler, supra note 4. at 301.
33 The head of the department of curatorial records at the National Gallery of Art in
Washington. D.C. noted. "[t]he very nature of World War II provenance research is
interdisciplinary. It requires knowledge of art history. politics, the history of
collections, and the locations of archival materials that document the movement of
art, in addition to historical provenance research, a fairly specialized methodology in
its own right." Nancy H. Yeide, Behind the Lines: Lessons in Nazi-Era Provenance
Research, MUSEUM NEWS, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 49.
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task.34 Because these paintings were stolen so long ago, they usually
have a decorated trade history. As time passes, the likelihood that
they can be identified by eyewitnesses fades. In order to prove a
claim, or even to recognize the existence of one, claimants may have
to check family records, governmental files, and auction records.
35
These sources of information may be hard to come by because, after
the Second World War, Europe was in a state of uncertainty, and
sources are likely scattered across borders. 36 Furthermore, the
"negligence by purchasers or donees in researching title [to the
artwork] propels these works of art through the marketplace."
37
There are also the financial burdens that claimants must bear.
Litigating Nazi-looted art claims is prohibitively expensive. 38 Plain-
tiffs must first track down the missing work,39 and they must
assemble enough evidence to show proper ownership. 40 These series
of events can take years to litigate - some have lasted a decade, or
34 Kaye, supra note 26, at 256. Today, heirs and descendants will typically assert a
claim for artwork or other items, and they may have trouble gaining access to
records, documentation, and other material that can factually establish ownership.
See id Those claimants are also unlikely to have meaningful personal knowledge
about the artwork's ownership and provenance. Spiegler, supra note 4. at 302, and
may only have a vague notion of what the piece even looks like. Indeed, many
second- and third-generation heirs may be "entirely unaware of what their ancestors
once owned and the legal rights ... that are attached to it." Henson, supra note 18, at
1147.
35 Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of
Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447,
461 62 (1999); see also Spiegler, supra note 4, at 302.
36 See Cuba, supra note 35, at 462 (citing Constance Lowenthal, Remarks at The
Holocaust: Moral & Legal Issues Un resolved 50 Years Later (Feb. 9, 1998) (trans-
cript on file with the Cardozo Law Review)).
37 Id. at 450-51.
38 Bazyler. supra note 19, at 183; see also ISABELLE FELLRATH GAZZINI, CULTURAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES: THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN RESOLVING NON-CONTRACTUAL
DISPUTES 57-58 (2004) (enumerating some of the costs of a typical art restitution
action); accord Kelly Crow, The Bounty Hunters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23 2007, at WI
(the heirs to artwork entitled Adele Bloch-Bauer I recently sold four other recovered
paintings for $192 million, but had to pay their attorney $100 million).
39 See Dowd, supra note 15, at 5 ("[I]t has become extremely expensive to research
these questions. involving, as it does, hiring expensive historians in multiple juris-
dictions to search for a needle in the proverbial haystack.").
40 See Spiegler. supra note 4. at 298; Henson supra note 18, at 1120; Kaye supra
note 26, at 256.
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longer.41 Thus, the cost of regaining the artwork increases substan-
tially as the years drag on.42 Consequently, it is highly likely that
claimants, even successful ones, will end litigation with significant
expenses. 43 In fact, some experts suggest that "claimants must be
prepared to spend at least $100,000 in costs just to begin litigation."
44
Some lawyers who specialize in art claims suggest that "if the art-
work is worth less than three million dollars, the work should be
given up" rather than having the heirs expend "exorbitant sums on
retrieval efforts." 45 Such a suggestion seems surprising, but actual
results have confirmed its truth. For example, a Connecticut claimant
spent nearly $10.4 million to recover stolen artworks worth about $22
million.46 Costs can reach dismal proportions even for those parties
who choose to settle. One recent settlement was reportedly "just
enough to cover the costs of litigation."
47
A final problem with litigating these claims is that public
trials can be harmful to the artwork itself and to the parties involved
in the dispute.48 In addition to tainting the artworks' merchantability,
the dispute casts doubt on the "credibility, reliability and reputation
of the parties involved" in its acquisition.
49
41 See, e.g., Carol Kino. Stolen Artworks and the Lavyers Who Reclaim Them, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007, at H28.
42 See GAZZINI, supra note 38, at 58 (describing the costs incurred during the "years
until a final decision is issued").
43 See Jennifer Kreder, Nazi-Looted Art: Should It Be Returned at All Costs?.
Address at the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities
Conference, sponsored by University of Texas (2005); see also Raymond Dowd,
Attacks on Owners of Stolen Art, COPYRIGHT LITIGATION BLOG, Jan. 10, 2009.
http://copyrightlitigation.blogspot.com/2009/01/attacks-on-owners-of-stolenart.html;
accord Minyard. supra note 2, at 116.
44 Tyler, supra note 20, at 444.
45 Id. at 444-45.
46 Carol Vogel, Recovered Artworks Heading to Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007,
at El.
47 Spiegler, supra note 4, at 303 (discussing the Goodman litigation discussed infra
note 97).
48 GAZZINI, supra note 38, at 57-58.
49 Id. at 56-57; see, e.g.. Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472 (RGK), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5862 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005) (dismissing a claim against actress. Elizabeth
Taylor, for return of Nazi-looted art); see also Linda Greenhouse, Elizabeth Taylor
to Keep Van Gogh, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 30, 2007, at E2.
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In the end, even though Nazi-looted art claims are on the rise,
the art remains difficult to reclaim and defend because of a myriad of
factors, which, when aggregated, make litigation unattractive and
ineffective. This situation threatens the entire purpose of implement-
ing public policy to restore the works of art to their proper places.
Not only does the impact of litigation costs undermine the "restorat-
ive-justice" 50 reasons for making these claims easier to bring, but also,
the high costs discourage claimants from bringing claims in the first
place. One must admit that parties likely think about the cost of filing
suit first, and will not litigate if it is not economically justified.51
Unsurprisingly, the expensive litigation costs associated with Nazi-
looted art restitution efforts tend to "yield[ ] far fewer results than
efforts to restitute other assets, such as other property and financial
holdings." 52 Reducing litigation costs is critical to ensuring effective
and meaningful resolutions.53 While numerous corrective solutions
have been proposed and implemented, the litigation system is still as
inadequate as it was prior to the proposals. The next section focuses
on the chaos that plagues Nazi-looted art cases, and why piling legis-
lation upon legislation is not an effective means to achieve the
ultimate goals of restorative-justice.
50 Lauren Fielder Redman, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using a "Shield"
Statute As a "Sword" for Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction in Art and Antiquities
Cases, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 781, 785 (2008); see also Anne-Marie Rhodes, On
Art, Theft, Tax, and Time: Triangulating Ownership Disputes Through the Tax
Code, 43 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 495, 525 (2006).
51 See David H. Isaacs, The Highest Form of Flattery? Application of the Fair Use
Defense Against Copyright Claims for Unauthorized Appropriation of Litigation
Documents, 71 Mo. L. REV. 391, 443 (2006) ("Where the transaction costs
associated with seeking restitution are greater than the amount the harmed party can
be expected to obtain from a lawsuit, the injured party will deem it economically
inefficient to sue in order to obtain restitution." (internal citations omitted)).
52 Weiss, supra note 29, at 870 (2007).
53 Cf Isaacs, supra note 51, at 443. (noting that "society as a whole obtains a benefit
from increasing the number of parties that can obtain restitution," a number which
can be increased by lowering transaction costs).
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IV. PRIOR SOLUTIONS HAVE PROVEN
INSUFFICIENT: THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AS
A SOLUTION
For one reason or another, Nazi-looted art cases seem to
implicate international factors in our minds, whether it is the circum-
stances of World War II, illicit global trade in art, or the widespread
emotional and political sentiment toward Nazi victims. Regardless of
the reasons, Nazi-looted art cases are not actually an issue that inter-
national politics will ever be able to solve. The events of World War II
occurred six decades ago, and many of the claims that arise are on an
individual basis, not on a governmental or international political
scale.54 A myriad of proposed and enacted international rules, guide-
lines, and legislation have attempted to address the claims of original
owners, heirs, and descendants for the return of Nazi-looted art and
other items. However, the bulk, if not all, of the solutions have
proven ineffective for numerous reasons.
A. Ineffectiveness of International Agreements
The first international agreement that attempted to govern
the restitution of Nazi-looted art claims was the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
of 1954 (hereinafter "the Hague Convention"). 55 The Hague Conven-
tion was created to "add teeth" to the policy of restitution by provid-
ing criminal penalties. 56 However, the drawback of the Hague Conv-
ention was that it only applied to the military.57 Thus, it is of very
little use - aside from providing policy arguments - to civil litigants.
54 But see Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688-702 (2004) (holding
that an exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§
1602-11 (2000), to the general grant of sovereign immunity found therein (and in
prior case law) applied to the Plaintiffs claim against the state of Austria for return
of Nazi-stolen art located in an Austrian state-owned museum).
55 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; see also John
Henry Merryman. Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property. 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 831, 835 (1986).
56 Claudia Caruthers, Comment, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy
of the Commons, 7 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 143, 148 (1998).
57 Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed
LegalAlternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 388 (1995).
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In 1970, a new solution to Nazi-looted art claims and other
cultural pillaging was proposed, known as The UNESCO Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970.58 The
UNESCO Convention contained a broader set of guidelines and rules
than the Hague Convention, and focused on remedies for civil claim-
ants.59 Nevertheless, like its predecessors, the UNESCO Convention
has been criticized for its limited enforceability. 60 The enforcement
problems associated with the UNESCO convention made it undesir-
able for many states to sign immediately.
61
Due to the shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention, the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law authored
another treaty, the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illicitly
Exported Cultural Objects.62 The UNIDROIT Convention allowed for
individual causes of action and harmonized substantive rules
governing claims.63 Yet, the major drawback of the UNIDROIT
Convention is that it provides a fifty-year statute of limitations, thus
precluding any claims arising from the Nazi era.64
The ability to create comprehensive binding international
agreements that are enforceable across the global community has
proven extremely difficult. Thus, the United States took an alter-
native approach and utilized a non-binding agreement. The 1998
Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets focused on "proce-
dures to be adopted by states to facilitate the resolution" of
Holocaust-era disputes.65 However, since the Conference was a non-
58 Lyndel V. Prott, Responding to World War II Art Looting, in RESOLUTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES/PEACE PALACE PAPERS 134 (2004).
59 Borodkin, supra note 57. at 389 (explaining that unlike the Hague Convention,
which only applied to the military, the UNESCO Convention granted countries the
ability to enter into agreements that enabled them to bring claims for stolen art and
antiquities in foreign jurisdictions).
60 GAZZINI, supra note 38, at 47 (stating that the Convention only provides
"extremely limited, counterproductive, when not altogether inappropriate," means of
enforcement).
61 See Borodkin, supra note 57, at 389 (stating that England, Switzerland, Germany,
Japan. the Netherlands and France have never ratified); GAZZINI. supra note 38, at
45-46.
62 Tyler, supra note 20, at 464.
63 See id
64 Id at 464-65.
65 Prott, supra note 58, at 135. At the conference, it was suggested that countries
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binding agreement, the guidelines adopted by the representatives of
the more than forty countries and organizations in attendance carry
no binding legal effect.66 Rather, the guidelines represent a general
political and social stance toward the restitution of Holocaust-Era
assets. As the non-binding nature of the Conference made the estab-
lishment of a uniform approach very difficult, participants were
satisfied with "general goals and guidelines" encouraging claimants
to "come forward." 67 Nevertheless, the Conference itself stands as a
general policy toward a theory of restorative-justice.
Scholars, commentators, politicians, and others have consis-
tently argued for international solutions, such as arbitration and
mediation, as alternatives to litigation to restore Nazi-looted art to its
rightful owners. 68 However, the proposed solutions have ignored key
facts. First, the use of international arbitration or mediation commis-
sions is only available when both parties to the case consent to juris-
diction.69 Furthermore, even if parties consented to the international
jurisdiction, binding international agreements governing stolen art
have a fifty-year record of failure, a shortcoming even their advocates
acknowledge.
70
publish lists of stolen or wrongfully appropriated cultural property, search for
possible owners, and return the items in question to the appropriate agencies or
bodies when successors in title could not be identified. Id.
66 Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation
To Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 Hous. L. REV.
193, 204-05 (2006).
67 Kreder, supra note 9, at 170-7 1.
68 See, e.g.. Lerner. supra note 23, at 36 (proposing a "restitution commission" to
settle such disputes); Claudia Fox, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in
Cultural Property. 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 225, 265 (1993) (proposing retro-
active application of the UNIDROIT Convention); Pell, supra note 12, at 28
(proposing creation of an international commission to facilitate mediation and
arbitration); Rebecca L. Garrett, Time for a Change?: Restoring Nazi-looted Artwork
to Its Rightful Owners, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 367, 392 (2000) (arguing for an
international solution to Nazi-looted art).
69 See Norman Palmer, Statutory, Forensic and Ethical Initiatives in the Recovery of
Stolen Art and Antiquities, in THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN ART 1, 268, 279 (Norman
Palmer ed., 1998) (arguing that international agreements need consent, either from
the parties in the case of arbitration or of their governments for binding international
agreements to be workable at all).
70 Nathan Murphy, Splitting Images: Shared-Value Settlement in Nazi-era Art
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There is an even more omnipresent issue regarding internat-
ional commissions: time. Setting up international arbitration, media-
tion, or binding international protocols is a costly and time-consum-
ing undertaking. 71 While costs are always of concern to parties in
litigation, international tribunals do not resolve monetary issues
involved with Nazi-era cases. In the context of Nazi-looted art cases,
in which evidence and witnesses may not be readily available, time is
an important factor. "[A]s the lifespan of remaining generations of
Holocaust survivors nears its end, pressing time constraints create
urgency." 72 Resolving claims can depend on highly individualized
facts, and so many scholars and commentators have advocated for
inter-national agreements. However, because of the "international
feel" of Nazi-looted art cases, it is simply unrealistic to rely on them
to effectively solve claims.
B. Domestic Regulation and Resolution
Instead of focusing on international agreements to resolve
claims for Nazi-looted art, the United States should concern itself
with domestic legislation. It is already apparent that the primary
parties to litigation of Nazi-looted art claims in the United States are
museums and individuals, not (foreign) government agencies. 73 In
addition, unlike the illicit trade in antiquities, there is little political
Restitution Claims 13 (June 26, 2009) (unpublished article, available at http://works.
bepress.com/nathan murphy/) (citing Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Indivi-
dual and Group Justice with the Need for Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 155, 163, 174 (2007) (discussing the failure of other international
agreements to reach meaningful results)).
71 See Pollock, supra note 66, at 230 (noting that binding agreements require
participation not only from governments, but also from "museums, auction houses,
and dealers both at home and abroad").
72 Shira T. Shapiro, Case Note, How Republic of Austria v. Altmann and United
States v. Portrait of Wally Relay the Past and Forecast the Future of Nazi Looted-
Art Restitution Litigation. 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2008).
73 See Pollock, supra note 66, at 204-05; see generally Stephen W. Clark, Selected
World War II Restitution Cases, A.L.I. A.B.A., COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 217 (2005); Associated Press, N. Y
Man Returns Nazi-looted Art Hanging in His Room, May 7, 2009, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=7522164; Catherine Hickley, Thousands of
Nazi-Looted Works Are Held by Museums, Survey Says. BLOOMBERG PRESS. Apr.
27, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601088&refer=muse&sid =
aTklztqGBb I.
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involvement on either side. Thus, it makes little sense to address the
current situation through an international stance.
In recognition of the growing complexities plaguing Nazi-
looted art claims in the United States, Congress passed the U.S.
Holocaust Assets Commission Act in 1998 - the same year as the
Washington Conference. The Act created a 21-member commission
whose main duties involve developing a thorough "historical record
of the collection and disposition of the assets" of Holocaust victims in
the event the assets ever come into the "possession or control of the
[f]ederal government."74 The Commission had a two-fold purpose:
first, to make Americans aware of how their government deals with
Holocaust-era looted art in conjunction with "the moral imperative to
remember, and learn from, the darkest period in modern times"; and
second, to provide assistance to Holocaust-looted art claimants with
the recovery of their stolen property. 75 However, the purpose and
effect of the Commission have been questioned. 76 To date, the Comm-
ission has only disseminated reports containing some recommenda-
tions, which have "broke[n] little new ground" and are considered by
some to be "a lost opportunity to provide definite answers" to quest-
ions regarding these claims.
77
Although the Commission and the Washington Conference have
not made great strides in the area of Holocaust-era art restitution, the
policy implications speak greatly to the public attitude toward Nazi-
looted art. In fact, there has been an influential effect of the policy
within the non-profit organization community, primarily with
museums. The policy toward restitution efforts of Nazi-looted art,
bolstered formally by the United States government in the Washing-
ton Conference and Presidential Advisory Commission, has
influenced both the development of museums' codes of ethics, 78 and
the promulgation of guidelines addressing Nazi-looted assets. 7
9
74 22 U.S.C. § 1621(3)(a)(1) (1998).
75 PACHA, supra note 6.
76 See Murphy. supra note 70, at 15.
77 Ralph Blumenthal, Panel on Nazi Art Theft Fell Short, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2003, at El.78 See MARILYN E. PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE FOR OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND
COUNSEL 460 (Kalos Kapp Press 2001) (1994).
79 See Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading with the Enemy: Holo-
caust Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 683, 710 (2003) (referencing the Washington Conference in stating that
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The two primary self-regulations guiding museums' restitu-
tion efforts are the Report of the American Association of Museum
Directors Task Force on the Spoliation of Art during the Nazi/World
War II Era80 and the American Association of Museums' Guidelines
Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi
Era.81 The overall policy goal of these regulations is to uphold the
ethical and educational purposes of museums, and to provide equit-
able restitution of disputes involving Nazi-looted art.82 Irrespective of
their legally unenforceable nature, these guidelines collectively
provide necessary instruction for museums to navigate the myriad of
legal doctrines and laws - often inconsistently applied - that govern
Nazi-looted art litigation. Furthermore, because no single law
governs the return of art confiscated by the Nazis during the Holo-
caust, it is fortunate that leading museum organizations in the United
States have promulgated guidelines to aid museum employees in
properly navigating provenance issues.
While the guidelines promulgated by the AAM and AAMD
are an ethical milestone in the effort to recover Nazi-looted art, the
actual recovery of the art itself is all but plain. In fact, neither the
AAM nor the AAMD require museums to return artwork to the
claimant, even if the claimant has fool-proof evidence. Rather, the
AAM proposes that museum's "should seek other methods than
"[t]he worldwide movement to recover Nazi-looted art also has its roots in the
United States"). Cf. Videotape: Edward Luby, Cultural Property and Asset
Repatriation (The Judah L. Magnes Museum Apr. 22, 2007), available at
http://fora.tv/2007/04/22/Cultural Property and Asset Repatriation (revealing that
there has been "a striking change in the last 20 years" regarding the growing
importance of the law in day-to-day museum activities).
80 ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK FORCE
ON THE SPOLIATION OF ART DURING THE NAZI/WORLD WAR II ERA (1998).
http://www.aamd.org/papers/guideln.php [hereinafter AAMD].
81 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE
UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION OF OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA (2001), http://www.
aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/nazi guidelines.cfm.
82 See ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, ART MUSEUMS AND THE
IDENTIFICATION AND RESTITUTION OF WORKS STOLEN BY THE NAZIS 4 (2007).
http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/Nazi-lootedart clean 06 2007.pdf(describ-
ing member museums' mission to "serve the public through art and education" and
noting that museums' directors remain accountable "to their trustees, staff, donors,
and community for ensuring that museums fulfill their public service mission and
reinforce the leadership position of museums as cultural and educational resources").
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litigation (such as mediation)" when a claimant has sufficient
evidence to establish ownership. 83 The AAMD suggests that media-
tion should be used when necessary, and that "the museum should
offer to resolve the matter in an equitable, appropriate, and mutually
agreeable manner."84 Neither set of guidelines calls for the imme-
diate return of the illicit artwork. Instead, the solution is merely to
seek an alternative to litigation, which would ultimately result in a
loss for the museum.
From the prior discussion, it is evident that the main element
weaving the legislation and regulations together in both the inter-
national and domestic context is the policy of restorative-justice.
Lawmakers have been utterly concerned with providing avenues for
claimants to bring their claims, all the while forgetting about the legal
and factual circumstances surrounding the claims. In addition,
museums and individuals will likely be quite unwilling to part with
the artwork because of the monetary investment in the piece. Thus,
the mere ability to bring a claim does little to help restitute the art-
work speedily and efficiently. Furthermore, the legislation ignores
the equitable adjustments that must be made in these contexts. Nazi-
looted art cases do not present a typical thief/victim scenario; nor do
they present a typical good-faith/bad-faith purchaser scenario. 85 The
factual circumstances in Nazi-looted art cases mandate an approach
that recognizes the equitable and legal rights of the victim and the
good-faith purchaser. In addition, parties should not be left at a
disadvantage when neither party has committed any wrongdoing.
These two critical concepts are what international and domestic
legislation have constantly ignored.
With so much legislation doing so little, it is time for a new
approach to the Nazi-looted art situation. The original owner of the
artwork in these situations was often the victim of outright looting by
the Nazi regime during World War II, or an unwilling participant in
83 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, supra note 81.
84 ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, supra note 80.
85 Some may argue that it is difficult to justify treating the Holocaust as a unique
historical event deserving special treatment. The problem of wartime looting of art is
not new. However, despite these concerns, the sheer magnitude of the Holocaust
mandates a unique approach. "The number of people affected, the amount of art
taken, the value of the art taken, and the countries involved make this atypical and
require a holistic solution." Schwartz. supra note 22, at 2 n.7.
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a forced sale. Alternatively, the good-faith purchaser innocently
bought the artwork or received it through donation unaware of the
work's disheartening past. When the courts are forced to choose
between these two innocent parties, it hardly seems that justice is
being given its full effect.
The Internal Revenue Code can provide an effective solution
to the dilemma, and at the same time, use of the Code furthers the all-
important policies that prior legislation and regulations have
attempted to accomplish, but in a much simpler form. More signific-
antly, the tax Code provides a neutral basis by which to resolve
private Nazi-looted art cases, thereby encouraging parties to avoid
litigation. The remainder of this article explores the means through
which the tax Code can achieve these policy objectives and the
potential role that the government may play in achieving these goals.
V. SECTION 170 AND SECTION 501(C)(3): THE
SOLUTION PROVIDED BY THE TAX CODE
A. An Introduction: The Interplay Between Sections 170 and 501(c)(3)
Section 501(c) of the Federal Internal Revenue Code (2009)
generally provides tax-exempt status to certain organizations. 86 For
purposes of this article, the focus is on section 501(c)(3), which grants
non-profit organizations an exemption from the federal income tax.
Section 501(c)(3) organizations include "corporations, and any
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes."87 Although there is scant
documented congressional history to explain Congress's decision to
grant tax-exempt status to certain organizations, courts and
commentators have taken it upon themselves to explain the basis for
tax-exemption. The widely accepted theory is that tax-exempt status
is granted to encourage activities that are "recognized as inherently
meritorious and conducive to the general welfare." 88 The United
86 I.R.C. § 501 (2009).
87 I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (2009).
88 David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of
Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law s Public Policy
Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779, 845 (2002) (quoting JAMES J.
FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 316
(Foundation Press 1995) (internal citations omitted)).
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States Supreme Court has also espoused a version of this theory. In
Bob Jones University v. United States,89 the Court noted that, "in
enacting ... § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to
charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private
institutions that serve a useful public purpose .... "90
Undeniably, museums and other similar organizations that
operate for charitable and educational purposes fall under the
characterization provided in section 501(c)(3), thereby providing
them tax-exempt status. 91 Working in conjunction with section
501(c)(3) is section 170 of the Code, which provides individuals with
advantageous tax deductions for contributions to section 501(c)(3)
organizations. 92 Section 170 encourages donation to these organiz-
ations by allowing donors to deduct contributions representing up to
50% of the donor's adjusted gross income.
93
Understandably, 501(c)(3) status for charities and the related
section 170 deduction for donors are important to many charitable
groups. Some individuals will not give to a charity if it does not have
501(c)(3) status, as no tax deduction would be allowed. Loss of this
status can therefore be harmful, if not fatal, to a charity's existence. In
addition, section 501(c)(3) organizations must be aware of the possi-
bility of having their tax-exempt status revoked if they engage in
actions that influence legislation or fail to serve a public purpose, and
the organization must make sure that no part of their net earnings
inure to the benefit of any private party.
94
The system of donations and deductions set up by the tax
Code provides a context in which to resolve Nazi-looted art disputes
without the need for litigating the issues in the court system.
Allowing an individual to donate the Nazi-looted artwork to a
section 501(c)(3) organization, which would either keep the item with
the claimants consent or return it to the person claiming it as their
own, would reduce the costs and time that it takes to successfully -
89 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
90 Id. at 587-88.
91 Stefanie H. Roth, Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Museum Relationships
with For-Profits, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: LEGAL ISSUES IN
MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION (2006), available at http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/
datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CL077 chapter 05 thumb.pdf.
92 I.R.C. § 170(b) (2009).
93 See I.R.C. § 170(b) (2009).
94 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2009).
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and efficiently - solve the dispute. As of today, only one Nazi-looted
art dispute has looked to the tax Code for a solution, Goodman v.
Searle.95 Searle illustrates that there are advantages to settling Nazi-era
artwork disputes out of court. Particularly, this case illustrates the
ability of the Internal Revenue Code to advance public policy, while
at the same time, allowing two innocent parties to avoid a detri-
mental loss.
96
B. The Test Case: Goodman v. Searle
Daniel C. Searle purchased a Degas pastel-over-monotype,
Landscape with Smokestacks, for $850,000 in July 1987. 97 A New York
art dealer informed the Art Institute of Chicago of the availability of
the Degas.98 The Art Institute arranged for Mr. Searle to view the
Degas at the apartment of its then-current owner.99 Then, the land-
scape was sent to the Art Institute for inspection.100 The artwork
received a "clean bill of health."10 1 In 1994, Mr. Searle loaned the
Degas to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York for an exhibi-
tion.10 2 In 1995, Mr. Searle received a letter of "demand for return"
from the grandsons of Friedrich and Louise Gutmann, who perished
at the hands of the Nazis during the Holocaust.10 3 They saw the
catalogue for the exhibition and recognized the work as one that had
belonged to their grandparents. 10 4 The heirs claimed that their grand-
parents sent the painting to Paris for safekeeping during World War
11.105 The family believed that Soviet troops had taken the artwork to
Russia at the conclusion of the War and had "hoped to find informa-
95 Rhodes, supra note 50, at 505-06.
96 Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C6459, (N.D. Ill. 1996).
97 Rhodes, supra note 50, at 504 (citing HOWARD J. TRIENENS, LANDSCAPE WITH







104 Id. at 504-05.
105 Kevin M. Williams, Degas Settlement Lands in Uncharted Territory. CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 43, available at http://www.museum-security.org/reports/
05098.html.
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tion about it after 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed" and archiv-
ed information became available.
10 6
Mr. Searle, however, claimed that the family had sold the
Degas because they were suffering financially during the War, but no
proof of sale existed. 10 7 Searle also argued that the applicable statute
of limitations barred the heirs' claims. 10 8 He argued that if they had
been more diligent in their search, instead of waiting until the fall of
the Soviet Union, they would have learned of the artwork's where-
abouts well before its sale to him.109 With their aunt, Lili Gutmann,
the grandsons sued Daniel Searle in July 1996 for return of the
Degas. 110 The controversy was highly publicized by both print and
broadcast media.111 The Degas was valued at approximately
$1,100,000.112 Two years after the original filing of the suit, the
parties, on the eve of trial, settled their dispute via section 501(c)(3)
and section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. 113
The settlement agreement provided that Lili Gutmann, Nick
Goodman, Simon Goodman, and Daniel Searle would transfer his or
her respective ownership interest in the artwork to the Art Institute
of Chicago. 114 Mr. Searle's transfer of ownership would constitute a
donation to a section 501(c)(3) organization, which would qualify as a
106 Spiegler. supra note 4. at 303.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id, Bazyler. supra note 19, at 169. Searle argued that the Goodmans should have
known about the Degas's presence in the United States because of the publication of
two books (in 1968 and 1974) that included information regarding the Degas, and
because of three exhibits at college museums (in 1965, 1968, and 1974) that featured
the Degas. Id. at 169 n.685. The plaintiffs claimed that they reported the loss of the
artwork immediately after the War to the Allied Forces, government officials in
Germany, France, and Holland, Interpol. art experts and the International Foundation
for Art Research. Id. at 170 n.686.
110 Rhodes, supra note 50, at 505 (citing TRIENENS, supra note 97, at 27-28).
111 Id. at 505 n.37 ("Print media included articles in the Los Angeles Times, the
Washington Post. the Chicago Tribune, the Boston Globe, ART News, and Chicago
Magazine. The story was broadcast on National Public Radio, the CBS program 60
Minutes, and on public television." (citing TRIENENS. supra note 97, at 28-34)).
112 Id. at 505 (citing TRIENENS. supra note 97, at 12).
113 Id. (citing TRIENENS, supra note 97, at 86, 93).
114 Id. (citing TRIENENS, supra note 97, at 93-94). Lili Gutmann, Nick Goodman, and
Simon Goodman would own half of the artwork and Mr. Searle would hold owner-
ship over the other half. See id
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tax deduction for him under section 170.115 The artwork was
appraised at $487,500.116 Mr. Searle used the appraisal and claimed a
charitable deduction of $243,750 under section 170 for his one-half
interest in the artwork. 117 The other parties sold their interest to the
Art Institute of Chicago. 118 "By each side recognizing at some level an
owner-ship interest of the other, and then by both triangulating their
interests to create ownership in a new third party, the dispute was
resolved." 119
Although the parties and the Institute clearly benefited from
the transaction, the heirs felt that the outcome was bittersweet. "Both
sides spent a ton of money .... It was a terrible waste, in a way ....
We're hoping this could be a landmark case that would show other
families one way to do it, so that they don't have to go through what
we did."120
1. The Benefits and Ingenuity of the Transaction
The settlement in Goodman v. Searle was novel in that it
allowed both sides to emerge without a total loss. In 1987, Mr. Searle
paid $850,000 for the Degas, and when he transferred his ownership
interest to the Art Institute in 1998, he received a $243,750 charitable
deduction.121 Likewise, the Goodman heirs were able to take owner-
ship of the artwork and sell their interest in it to the Art Institute. In
all, the dispute over who had legal title to the artwork was a minimal
concern as long as both parties benefited from the transaction. In fact,
it is true that Mr. Searle clearly suffered a monetary loss on the
artwork. However, the Gutmann heirs also suffered a loss because
115 Id.
116 Id. at 506 (citing TRIENENS, supra note 97, at 94-96). The final appraisal price




120 Williams, supra note 105, at 43 (statement of Nick Goodman, one of the heirs).
The Goodman family initiated negotiations with Mr. Searle. According to Nicholas
Goodman, grandson of the original owners, trying to negotiate a settlement was
difficult: "We are trying to negotiate a settlement. They are reluctant to settle. The
problem we are finding is that any potential adversary, being wealthy enough to own
a Degas or a Renoir, likely has the resources to engage in protracted litigation such
as ours. The monetary expenses are unbelievable." FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 90.
121 Rhodes, supra note 50, at 506.
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they could have litigated the matter in court, won the case, received
the artwork, and then they might have sold it for its full fair market
value. Nevertheless, when juxtaposing the outcome of the case with
the potential "winner-take-all" outcome that would have resulted if
the case had gone to court, it was clearly better for the parties to
settle. 122 Since the parties settled, they saved a tremendous amount in
courts costs, time, and energy.
123
While the easiest way for parties to reduce costs is to reach a
negotiated settlement, such techniques are often overlooked as an
option because of the perception that an indivisible art object cannot
be shared.124 Yet, as Searle demonstrates, there is at least one viable
option to satisfy both sides of the case - it is simply a matter of
searching for the appropriate area of law to resolve the dispute rather
than automatically relying on the judicial system. The tax Code
benefited all parties involved, even the Art Institute, which received
the Degas at a reduced price. In addition to resolving the dispute
equitably, the tax Code furthers the policy that so many bills of legis-
lation have tried to accomplish.
If the entire purpose behind legislation regarding Nazi-looted
art is to return the artwork to the original owners and heirs, then
there should not be a reason to object to the use of the tax Code in
resolving these disputes. Congress' concern was not to punish the
current possessor but to provide relief to the original owner. Thus,
the tax Code falls squarely in line with Congressional intent. Settle-
ments that utilize the tax Code will cost the U.S. government nothing,
and the transactions support the theory of restorative-justice.
As of today, legislation has done little to effectuate the return
of Nazi-looted art. Use of the tax Code accomplishes what legislation
122 The high cost and lengthy process of litigation may well have cost Mr. Searle
more than what he paid for the artwork. In addition, there was the probable risk that
Mr. Searle would lose the case, and thus, he would have nothing for his efforts. For
arguments that settlements are generally less expensive, see, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567-571(6th ed. 2003); James N. McNally,
Lessons Learned in the Court of Appeals Settlement Program. 79 MICH. B.J. 488,
488 (2000) ("Settlements bring higher satisfaction among litigants and can be a
cheaper. quicker alternative to litigation.").
123 Parties still incur some litigation costs when they settle, but they are usually much
lower than the cost of going to trial. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple
Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs. 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1722-23, 1726 (2005).
124 Murphy. supra note 70, at 26-27.
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has failed to accomplish: it embodies a neutral policy which does not
discriminate based on the status of the current possessor or the
original owner. Allowing current possessors a tax deduction for a
donation of their interest in the artwork to a section 501(c)(3) organiz-
ation resolves the dispute over title, and subsequently, the public also
benefits by the organization's acquisition of the item.
In further support of the tax Code, sixty years of resolutions,
agreements, and legislation have not made claims logistically easier
to bring. Claimants do not see any benefit in bringing a claim in the
U.S. court system due to high transaction costs. However, with the
use of the tax Code as a negotiation element, claimants may see the
probability of spending less money, which would encourage them to
pursue negotiation settlements at a much earlier time, rather than
heading to court. 125
2. Potential Problems
As with any proposed solution to the Nazi-looted art dispute,
there are potential drawbacks to the use of the tax Code. However,
the problems are not serious enough to discredit such an approach in
its entirety. Probably the most concerning issue is that many may feel
that use of the tax Code is an attempt to shift financial liability from
the current possessor to all taxpayers. Since the artwork's value is
likely to be very high, the amount in controversy is also going to be
very high.126 Of course, taxpayers do not like to hear that they will be
financing a tax deduction, especially of an individual in a high tax
bracket.127 Yet, the notion that taxpayers are ultimately paying for the
current possessor's deduction is not sufficient to defeat the purpose
of the donation, nor is it sufficient to disregard the tax Code approach
to the dispute. The availability of section 170 deduction for charitable
contributions to section 501(c)(3) organizations is an option available
125 See generally Rhodes. supra note 50 (discussing the tax treatment of sales of
artwork, which may constitute long-term capital gain or loss, instead of ordinary
income).
126 For example, Thomas Kline, counsel for the Gutmann family in Goodman v.
Searle, stated, "I am almost at the point of saying that if the art isn't worth $3
million, don't go after it." Lee Rosenbaum, Will Museums in U.S. Purge Nazi-
Tainted Art?. ART IN AMERICA, Nov. 1998, at 38, available at http://findarticles.
com/p/articles/mi m1248/is nil v86/ai 21257944/.
127 More than likely, an individual who was able to purchase a Nazi-looted piece of
art was quite wealthy.
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to everyone willing to make a donation. Furthermore, the events are
most likely a one-time occurrence. Thus, taxpayers do not constantly
subsidize the same transactions from a single possessor. Further-
more, the entire motivation behind the transaction is in favor of
everyone, not a single few. The donation to a section 501(c)(3)
organization creates public ownership of the artwork, and therefore,
public oversight. As previously stated, if the goal of legislation is to
resolve the dispute over title, the use of the tax Code accomplishes
this goal without significant intervention of the government or the
court system.
A second concern for many is that allowing tax deductions
for donations of Nazi-looted artwork increases the trade in illicit
artwork. 128 Some may feel that if current possessors can achieve tax
deductions by donating their interest to a section 501(c)(3) organiz-
ation, then bad-faith purchasers will seek out Nazi-looted art and try
to achieve the same tax deductions in similar transactions. However,
these fears are misplaced because the likelihood of actually discover-
ing Nazi-looted art is relatively low. If Nazi-looted artwork could be
discovered so easily, then we would expect to see a large amount of
claimants coming forth. Also, the likelihood that Nazi-looted art is
being sold on the black market is unlikely because of the general
unawareness of a given item's provenance. 129 Thus, the difficulty in
discovering whether an item was looted by the Nazi regime sixty
years ago negates the idea that people will trade the artwork at
immense rates on the black market.
On the other hand, there is a significant issue that can occur
in a slightly different context that can have a tremendous impact on
negotiations that utilize the tax Code. The logic differs slightly when
two parties in a dispute regarding Nazi-looted art seek to use section
501(c)(3) organizations as conduits to return the property to the
128 Rhodes, supra note 50, at 523-24; Emily C. Ehl. Case Comment, The Settlement
of Greece v. Ward: Who Loses?. 78 B.U.L. REV. 661, 685 86 (1998).; see Matthew
L. Wald, Tax Scheme is Blamed for Damage to Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4. 2008,
at El; see also Borodkin, supra note 57, at 405.
129 A review of many of the claims already brought in courts demonstrates that
current possessors were often completely unaware of the item's provenance, and that
the sellers were usually innocent. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804
(1966); Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Wash. 1999);
Springfield Library and Museum Ass'n v. Knoedler Archivum, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d
32 (D. Mass. 2004).
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original owner, similar to what occurred in Greece v. Ward, an illicit
antiquities case.
130
In 1993, the Ward Gallery, a prestigious New York art gallery,
exhibited and offered for sale a collection of ancient Mycenaean
jewelry and artifacts.1 31 Greece initiated an investigation and claimed
the Ward collection included treasures taken from the Mycenaean
tombs. 132 The parties announced that they had agreed to a mutually
beneficial out-of-court settlement. 133 The Ward Gallery agreed to
donate the collection of Mycenaean artifacts to the Society for the
Preservation of the Greek Heritage, a Washington-based nonprofit
charitable organization, and in turn, Greece agreed to withdraw its
lawsuit.134 In effect, the Society for the Preservation of the Greek
Heritage, a section 501(c)(3) organization,135 acted as a conduit
between the settling parties. "The Gallery donated the treasure collec-
tion to the Society, and then the Society handed the treasure over to
Greece. This creative settlement allowed the Ward Gallery to claim a
tax deduction under section 170 and to recoup its acquisition cost of
the stolen antiquities, which was rumored to be $150,000." 136
In the context of Nazi-looted art cases, it would not be a leap
of judgment to assume that parties might construct their transaction
similar to that in Ward. A current possessor might donate the artwork
to a section 501(c)(3) organization, taking the maximum tax deduc-
tion allowed, and then the organization would return the artwork to
130 See generally Rhodes, supra note 50, at 502-04 (citing Greece v. Ward, No. 93
Civ. 2493 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1993)).
131 Id. at 502.
132 See id at 503.
133 See id
134 Ricardo J. Elia, Case Notes, Greece v. Ward: The Return of Mycenean Artifacts, 4
INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 119, 122 (1995); Mary Williams Walsh, A Grecian
Treasure: Back From the Grave?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at Al.
135 Join The Society for the Preservation of the Greek Heritage. http://www.
spghworld.org/joinspgh.htm (last visited Apr. 10. 2009).
136 Ehl, supra note 128, at 675 (citing Ivin Molotsky. 20 Years After Thievery, Rare
Gold Ornaments Will Return to Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at C16)
(additional citations omitted). After briefly displaying the collection in the Russell
Senate Office Building in Washington. D.C. in January 1996, the Society returned
the collection to Greece in early February 1996. Molotsky, supra.
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the claimant. Such a transaction allows both parties to benefit to the
fullest, but denies the public any interest in the item.
137
In these situations, the argument becomes much easier for the
opponents of transactions that utilize the tax Code. Here, the organi-
zation receives - and keeps - nothing of tangible value, thereby
defeating the public benefit theory behind the tax-exempt status of
the organization. One party then abuses the section 501(c)(3) organiz-
ation in order to obtain a favorable tax deduction. On the other hand,
the organization has arguably helped to further the public policy of
providing restitution to victims of the Holocaust, and consequently,
descendants and heirs of the victims. This seemingly fulfills the
public benefit purpose of the tax-exempt organizations. In addition,
when neither party to the dispute is a thief or a bad-faith purchaser,
society does not suffer any harm. From this author's viewpoint, it
seems better to allow the parties to utilize the section 501(c)(3)
organization because the artwork returns to its original owner, heirs,
or descendants, thus fulfilling the restorative-justice goals of Cong-
ress. Nevertheless, a tax-deduction for the current possessor hardly
appears proper when the public has received nothing in return. Thus,
it would be more appropriate for Congress to enact a small revision
in the tax Code allowing the completion of the transaction, but only
allowing a tax credit in these instances, not a tax deduction. This
minor revision would combat the notion that taxpayers are financing
the transaction.
Even with the potentially negative motivations of current
possessors to utilize section 501(c)(3) organizations, not all claimants
have the most respectable intentions. Claimants who only intend to
137 Furthermore, there is a secondary argument, that there might be a fear that current
possessors might start donating the artwork to section 501(c)(3) organizations
without providing the sufficient information to alert the organizations as to the
provenance issues. However, with the AAM and AAMD guidelines in place, and in
light of general awareness of the importance of thorough research for acquisitions,
section 501(c)(3) organizations have taken and are taking a more technical
approach to preventing this situation. See generally Stephen J. Knerly, Jr., Selected
Issues for American Art Museums Regarding Holocaust Era Looted Art, Prague
Conference on Holocaust Era Assets, available at http://www.aamd.org/advocacy/
(discussing the various approaches that US museums have taken to guard against
false artwork, discover Holocaust-Era artwork in inventories, and specifically
stating, "U.S. museums are fully committed to responding to all claims carefully and
in good faith").
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sell an item, once reclaimed, to a third party raise the issue of
"monetization" of the Holocaust - a criticism leveled at victims and
heirs who seek financial recovery for their losses. 138 In this circum-
stance, it seems better to allow both parties to utilize section 501(c)(3)
organizations, as in Searle. Allowing a claimant to reclaim a piece of
artwork for the purpose of selling the item seems to contravene the
moral reasons for restituting the artwork. Encouraging negotiated
settlements via the tax Code provides benefits to innocent parties and
incidental benefits to society as well. Thus, the aggregate benefit to all
should occupy a higher place in our echelon of values, so that we
hesitate to view the benefit to one individual as an absolute. In
essence, it appears there is an ultimate question of whether society
sees that it is better to fulfill the concept of restorative-justice, or
whether it is better to stop a single individual from benefiting in
these situations.
3. Nevertheless, the Ends Justify the Means
Even with the fear of exploitation of section 501(c)(3) organiz-
ations, it is undeniable that settlements of these cases using the tax
Code comport with, and further, the ethical and legal goals of all
prior legislation. In fact, domestic tax law recognizes the tax-exempt
status of money received from Germany by Holocaust victims in
connection with Nazi confiscated property. I.R.S. Notice 95-31139 states
that monetary compensation or property received by U.S. individuals
under the German Act Regulating Unresolved Property Claims for
property confiscated by Nazis or subjected to a forced sale represents
compensation for damages and is exempt from U.S. taxation. 140 Use
of section 501(c)(3) and section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code as a
means to achieve the decisive objective of restorative-justice out-
weigh the potential negativities associated with their use. Nazi-looted
art cases are instances where the results, and public policy associated
138 Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation
in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 795, 827 (2002).
139 1995-1 C.B. 307. 1995 WL 279779 (I.R.S.).
140 See also Convention on Income Tax, U.S. F.R.G., art. XIX, l(c), Aug. 2. 1989,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 101 10 (1990) (providing that the entire monetary amount,
including interest, is exempt from taxation under the income tax convention between
the United States and Germany).
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with it, justify the use of the tax code to allow both sides of the
dispute to avoid a total loss.
C. Creation of a Government Entity
In the face of all the adversity and positivity, there is at least
one aspect of section 501(c)(3) organizations, in the context of Nazi-
looted art cases, that should be altered by Congress. Rather than
allowing parties to agree upon any section 501(c)(3) organization,
there should be a central federal organization, incorporated as a
section 501(c)(3) organization, that deals specifically with Holocaust-
era disputes. As stated, potential problems regarding the use of
section 501(c)(3) organizations as nothing more than pass-through
entities might encourage sham transactions in which the public
receives nothing of value despite both parties having benefited. Such
transactions leave the entity's section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status in
jeopardy. However, the creation of a federally controlled section
501(c)(3) organization would relieve societal skepticism from the
issue.
Congress should create a single entity that would be respon-
sible for helping the parties resolve their dispute, and at the same
time, keep the public's best interest in mind. Parties would be
directed to seek settlement through the federal section 501(c)(3) entity
in order to gain a charitable tax deduction under section 170. The
entity would be responsible for researching the provenance of the
artwork, estimating its appraisal value, and approving the trans-
action in its entirety, including all relevant tax consequences. This
would ensure the purpose of section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status is
fulfilled.
The parties should only be allowed to seek out alternate
501(c)(3) organizations in cases where they are unable to come to a
negotiated settlement that the federal 501(c)(3) organization
approves. Nonetheless, even in these instances, the alternate section
501(c)(3) organization should obtain approval from the federal
501(c)(3) organization on the terms of the deductions and transfers. It
is entirely possible that one section 501(c)(3) organization will agree
to pay a higher price for an item than the federal entity may offer to
pay. For example, in Searle it is possible that the non-profit organiz-
ation might have agreed upon a higher price than this paper's aspira-
tional federal entity would agree to pay, which would have resulted
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in Mr. Searle obtaining a larger deduction and the Gutmann family
receiving a higher amount of payment for the artwork. This is not a
concern because section 501(c)(3) organizations will likely obey
market fluctuations and economic factors. The federal entity's
approval would protect against a sham-type transaction, in which the
current possessor/donor may attempt to claim a large deduction. The
organization, however, would simply give the artwork to the
claimant, as was the case in Ward.141 In these situations, a federal
entity would ensure that the donor receives a tax credit rather than a
deduction. Thus, such a federal entity would ensure that the public
benefits from the transaction while simultaneously upholding
Congress' motivation for granting tax-exempt status to section
501(c)(3) organizations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Transactions that use section 501(c)(3) organizations as
conduits to further their own tax prerogatives do not necessarily
entail abuse of either the organization or the tax code. It is a common-
ly accepted principle that U.S. taxpayers may minimize their taxes
and maximize their deductions, within limits. 142 There is no reason to
conclude that taxpayers involved in a dispute regarding Nazi-looted
art cases be precluded from taking advantage of the tax code to
resolve the complex disputes, which invoke deep emotional and
psychological considerations, making them unsuitable for litigation.
As one author has eloquently stated,
For a legal system that adjudicates on a case-by-
case basis, a claim over ownership of a unique
work of art is a zero sum game - one winner, one
141 See also Borodkin, supra note 57, at 404 (discussing a case where a current
possessor donated Turkish sarcophagus to a section 501(c)(3) organization to
avoid litigation and took a tax deduction under section 170, but where the organiz-
ation sent the sarcophagus to Turkey on permanent loan); Hugh Pope, Turkish
Jubilation over Recovery of Ancient Sarcophagus: Smuggled Treasure is Coming
Home, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 27, 1994, at 1, available at http://www.independent.
co.uk/ (enter "Turkish jubilation" in search box).
142 Comm'r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394, 398 (1972) ("Taxpayers
are ... generally free to structure their business affairs as they consider to be in their
best interests, including lawful structuring ... to minimize taxes.").
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loser. This harsh reality of uniqueness, set against
the competing interests of legitimate market
concerns and demands of restorative-justice,
requires fresh and open inquiry into workable
solutions.
143
One assumes that claimants want to avoid high transaction
costs in art restitution claims by settling. 144 However, Nazi-looted Art
cases do not settle at the expected rate. In a recent multi-year
academic study of major American art restitution cases, the report
showed that less than one-third of them settled out of court.145 This
number is somberly lower than the average settlement rate for
American litigation, which is between ninety and ninety-eight
percent. 146 It seems the parties involved in Nazi-looted art disputes
tend to believe their only option is to get everything or nothing at all.
These beliefs restrict parties from coming to a negotiated agreement
because neither side is willing to go home empty-handed. Bargaining
over indivisible objects - like artwork - often fails because indivisi-
bility creates a "psychological barrier that leads the claimants to think
in zero-sum terms." 147 The moment litigants perceive a dispute as
"zero-sum" or "win-lose" rather than "win-win," the benefit they
could otherwise enjoy through a compromise disappears complete-
ly. 148 The tax code can provide solutions to the "zero-sum" mindset
143 Rhodes, supra note 50, at 524.
144 Nevertheless, parties do agree to settle. This is especially true when claimants
have a particularly strong evidentiary record against the current possessor. See, e.g.,
Felicia R. Lee, Seattle Museum To Return Looted Work, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999,
at E4 (describing how the board of trustees of the Seattle Art Museum unanimously
chose to return Matisse's Odalisque after its World War II theft was documented in
Hector Feliciano's book).
145 GAZZINI, supra note 38, at 61. But cf id n.95 (noting that many of the cases that
settled did so recently). This suggests that, though still not as often as theory would
predict, some parties are beginning to find ways for their claims to be concluded out
of court.
146 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement:
A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer. 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 77, 84 (1997) (estimating
the rate at more than ninety percent).
147 H. Peyton Young, Dividing the Indivisible, 38 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 904, 904
(1995) (including paintings in a list of"indivisibles").
148 GAZZINI, supra note 38, at 63; see also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against
the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1987) (discussing how
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in these situations. Allowing both the parties and society to benefit is
the ultimate goal, and is achievable through the effective structuring
of a transaction in a manner that capitalizes on provisions of the tax
code.
Although critics are correct in stating that potential abuse
exists in transactions that merely use section 501(c)(3) organizations
as conduits to gain tax deductions, their apprehension is overempha-
sized. Potential abuse of the court system and of the tax code are
always a factor. Nevertheless, the courts and the tax system adjust
accordingly to the people's needs and to public policy. As of this
date, the Internal Revenue Service has not found a transaction similar
to Searle to be in violation of any public policy or otherwise abusive
of the tax system. As such, it is clear the I.R.S. interprets the purpose
of the section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations as being met by
effectuating the resolution of replevin and restitution claims in the
case of artifacts and artwork in these contexts.
In sum, the benefits of this proposal are: (1) parties are
encouraged to allow artwork to remain in the museums, with
charities, and within the public purview, where they belong, by
means of a tax deduction; (2) compensation is provided to the Holo-
caust victims, their heirs, and descendants; (3) disputes over title are
solved efficiently and equitably, avoiding the complexities of liti-
gation; (4) little revision of the Internal Revenue Code is needed; and
(5) all of the foregoing is accomplished at little or no cost to society.
The foregoing proposal presents an alternative to inefficient results
provided by litigation in the U.S. court system. It is an equitable
resolution to the competing interests of innocent parties and societal
standards.
departing from the "winner-take-all principle" that normally governs toward forms
of compromise may be preferable in child-custody disputes). Likewise, art cases are
often seen as "winner-take-all propositions" with no possibility of compromise. See
Sue Choi, Comment, The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 167, 191 (2005) (arguing
that restitution claims can settle).
v. 17
